Incentives to participate in wellness programs or reach health-related targets are becoming popular, but might expose employers and insurers to litigation risk because incentives might violate state and federal insurance, anti-discrimination, or privacy laws. This paper reviews relevant state and federal law, as well as case law and secondary literature. Findings suggest that convergence of state and federal law and recent court decisions have clarified the range of permissible incentives so that litigation risk under bona fide wellness programs seems limited.
Incentives to participate in wellness programs or reach health-related targets are becoming popular, but might expose employers and insurers to litigation risk because incentives might violate state and federal insurance, anti-discrimination, or privacy laws. This paper reviews relevant state and federal law, as well as case law and secondary literature. Findings suggest that convergence of state and federal law and recent court decisions have clarified the range of permissible incentives so that litigation risk under bona fide wellness programs seems limited.
Rising health care costs have increased interest in using employer-based wellness programs 1 to reduce costs and improve employees' health. A recent meta-analysis suggested a three-to-one return on investment in wellness programs in terms of employee medical costs and productivity (Baicker, Cutler, and Song 2010) . An earlier review of 122 studies found positive effects on productivity, health costs, and clinical outcomes (Pelletier 2005) . These results have promoted program use: The share of firms offering wellness programs has increased from 58% in 2009 to 65% in 2011. In firms with 200 or more workers, 90% offer at least one wellness program to their employees (Kaiser 2010 (Kaiser , 2011 .
The passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) has further stimulated interest in wellness programs. The extension of insurance coverage will grow the potential market for wellness programs. In addition, the ACA includes several provisions to promote wellness programs. Notably, it provides start-up grants to small firms; establishes a 10-state demonstration program on rewards for wellness program participation in the individual market; and assigns a technical assistance role for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
The ACA also gives employers more latitude to reward employees for program uptake, which is increasingly regarded as critical to engaging employees and thus realizing the full value of the programs (Goetzel et al. 2007 ). It raises the maximum incentive to employees for achieving healthrelated standards, such as reaching a target weight, to 30% of the cost of their insurance coverage. The new limit, which takes effect January 1, 2014, can-with approval from the Secretaries of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury-be increased to 50% of the cost of coverage. However, the ACA also obliges employers to offer an alternative set of wellness standards for some individuals, in recognition that health targets (particularly concerning weight and obesity) may sometimes be unreasonably difficult or medically inadvisable for particular individuals to meet.
In 2011, about 14% of employers used financial incentives such as gift cards, merchandize, or cash to encourage wellness program engagement, an increase of 6% compared to 2010. The percentage is higher in larger firms; 27% of firms with 200 or more employees offer wellness incentives (Kaiser 2010 (Kaiser , 2011 .
Federal-level legal provisions that can impact wellness programs have been explored more in detail in the past, and a number of state-level statutes and regulations that could also potentially be applicable have at least been alluded to (e.g., Mello and Rosenthal 2008; Simon et al. 2006; Shurtz 2005; Moran 2008 ). The potential applicability of both federal-and state-level laws also has raised concerns among key stakeholders, such as health plans offering wellness programs. In a related project, in which we interviewed 24 health plans covering about 70 million members in the commercial segment, a nonnegligible portion of the health plans indicated they consider legal aspects as having high or moderate impact on their operations of chronic care management programs (including wellness programs). 2 In particular, 38% of the plans regarded state and federal restrictions on member incentives as having high or moderate impact on their program operation. Forty-six percent stated that privacy laws at the state level had high or moderate impact, while 54% viewed the same laws at the federal level as having high or moderate impact. Nondiscrimination regulation was still viewed by 21% as having high or moderate impact. Thirty-eight percent regarded other state regulatory restrictions as having high or moderate impact, and a quarter of the interviewees viewed the variation in state regulation as having high or moderate impact. The existing uncertainty about the range and application of potentially relevant laws, as well as the perception that infringing such laws by offering wellness incentives bears the risk of costly litigation, may discourage firms from offering incentives for program uptake.
In light of all this, the current paper aims to assess whether such concerns have been confirmed in practice. To do so, our paper offers an overview of provisions that apply to incentives for wellness programs (Table 1) . Since previous reviews have primarily analyzed the potential impact of federal laws, we focus on pertinent state statutory law and case law that to our knowledge have not yet been reviewed. Our review concentrates on the key areas of state law, as opposed to a detailed state-by-state review of all applicable laws and regulations.
In exemplifying the potential legal impacts, we give some precedence to incentives for weight loss given that obesity is a key driver of the chronic disease burden and rising health care costs (Mokdad et al. 2003; Wang et al. 2011; Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wang 2003; Yang and Hall 2008) , and thus weight loss is of great policy interest when it comes to wellness programs. It is amenable to behavior change on one hand (Goodpaster et al. 2010; Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro 2003) , but also influenced by genetic components and social determinants on the other (Fishbein 2001; Biondi 2010; Goodpaster et al. 2010) , triggering the legal and policy questions of how to best balance societal goals and individual protection.
Methods
We reviewed federal law regulating incentives for wellness programs. We conducted a review of legal databases (Lexis Nexis, Legal Periodical Index, Westlaw's American Law Reports) to identify secondary literature dealing with financial incentives in wellness programs under state laws. In addition, we reviewed case law databases covering decisions of the highest courts in all states (Lexis Nexis), and trial court verdict databases in the four most populous states (California, Texas, New York, and Florida). For the latter, we used Westlaw's combined jury verdict databases, which provide summaries of jury verdicts, judgments, settlements, and arbitration awards from federal and state proceedings in the respective states. 3 For an overview of relevant state statutes and regulatory provisions (e.g., pertaining to lifestyle discrimination laws), we drew on secondary literature reviews; the online resources of the National Conference of State Legislatures; and our own review and validation of statutes and regulations through searches using state databases on Westlaw and Lexis Nexis. 4
Findings

Overview
Conceptually, three types of laws can impose restrictions on the use of incentives for wellness program uptake. The first type is insurance law, which governs the factors that may be considered in determining insurance premiums because financial incentives for wellness programs could be interpreted as charging differential premiums. Most insurance laws only limit incentives for attaining a health-related goal, such as a weight target, but not incentives for providing information or participating in a wellness program (Mello and Rosenthal 2008) . The second type is antidiscrimination law, which prohibits employers from using protected characteristics, such as age, sex, and disability, in compensation decisions. The third type is privacy law, which prevents employers from gaining access to sensitive information about employees: Providing incentives to self-report such information can be viewed as coercive. In some instances, privacy law may also prevent employers from using legally permitted personal off-duty behavior, such as smoking, in employment decisions.
State insurance laws only restrict incentives that are offered as part of health coverage. That is, incentives that an employer offers to all employees directly, irrespective of which insurance plan, if any, they join, are not regulated by insurance laws. Moreover, selffunded plans, under which the employer retains the insurance risk but pays a carrier to administer the benefit, are exempt from state insurance regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). In contrast, state and federal anti-discrimination and privacy laws can apply to all incentives, regardless of whether they are offered under a health plan or by the employer directly, and whether or not the employer is self-insured. 5
Federal Provisions Relevant to Wellness Program Incentives are Generally Well Understood
Significant research (e.g., Mello and Rosenthal 2008; Simon et al. 2006 
Federal regulations
HIPAA X X -ADA X X X GINA X X X
State regulation
Insurance law -X -Employment discrimination law X a X X Employment discrimination for off-duty conduct X a X X Genetic discrimination X a X X Notes: HIPAA5 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act; ADA5 Americans with Disabilities Act; GINA5 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. a Preempted if the state law does relate to employee benefit plans.
The three federal laws directly relevant to wellness program incentives are the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. Overall, these laws impose few restrictions on incentives for participation in bona fide wellness programs, but limit incentives for achieving health-related standards and mandate the availability of an alternative standard if an individual is medically unable to achieve the general standard.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)-1996. 6 HIPAA is the central federal nondiscrimination provision for group health plans and issuers of group health insurance. The nondiscrimination rule 7 specifies that no person can be denied group health insurance or be charged more for coverage based on health status, genetic history, evidence of insurability, disability, or claims experience.
While HIPAA would preclude incentives for achieving health-related standards, an explicit exception for wellness programs allows them if: 8 1. The reward is currently limited to 20% of the cost of the member's coverage, 9 2. The wellness program is reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease, 3. The member can try to obtain the reward at least once a year, 4. The reward is available to all ''similarly situated'' people, 10 and if a medical condition makes it inadvisable or impossible to meet the standard, the member can meet a reasonable alternative standard, and 5. The availability of the alternative standard is disclosed in program materials (Jesson 2008; Mello and Rosenthal 2008) .
HIPAA only applies to group health plans and does not regulate incentives provided directly by employers (Mello and Rosenthal 2008) .
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)-1990. 11 The ADA prohibits employers from discriminating on the basis of disability, including in the areas of compensation and benefits. 12 It prohibits employers from requiring employees to undergo a medical examination and from making medical inqui-ries about employees, unless an employee gives them permission to do so or the inquiries are necessary to determine an employee's ability to perform his/her duties. 13 To illustrate some limitations of ADA's protection, we look at the case of obesity. 14 Given very restrictive interpretation of ''disability'' under the ADA in the past, it would appear that only an employee who is suffering from morbid obesity 15 based on a physiological cause, 16 and as a consequence is substantially limited in major life activities, could claim ADA protection. These narrow requirements would have excluded most obese people from bringing successful claims against ''penalty-based wellness programs designed to incentivize weight loss'' (Patrick 2008) . 17 With the passage of the ADA Amendments Act (ADAAA), which established a broader scope of protection, it has theoretically become possible that obesity, and potentially even nicotine addiction, could be covered under the definition of disability. 18 In September 2011, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)-the commission responsible for administering the ADA-notably brought suit against an employer for allegedly terminating a morbidly obese employee because of his obesity, claiming that morbid obesity constitutes a ''disability'' within the meaning of the ADAAA. 19 Such a generous interpretation could in theory threaten the legality of wellness programs that offer rewards for reaching weight targets (Jesson 2008; Fensholt and Holloway 2009; Thompson 2010) .
The EEOC had previously indicated that ''voluntary'' 20 health risk appraisals (HRAs), medical examinations, and wellness programs may be in compliance with the ADA, but had questioned the legality of mandatory HRAs or penalties for nonparticipation in wellness programs (Tinnes 2011) .
On the other hand, the ADA provides a safe harbor for bona fide benefit plans, when provisions of plans are not used as a subterfuge to evade ADA. Invoking this safe harbor provision, the federal district court in Florida rejected the plaintiff's claim in Seff v. Broward County, 21 that the employer's health plan, which required completion of an HRA and a biometric screening, violated the ADA by imposing a biweekly $20 surcharge on participants who declined. 22 Although the ruling is ''not binding on the EEOC or necessarily persuasive in other jurisdictions'' (Tinnes 2011) , it does show how the courts can apply the ADA's safe harbor provision to confirm the legality of mandatory HRAs and wellness plans that include penalties.
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)-2008. 23 GINA prohibits discrimination based on genetic information. In particular, it prohibits: a) insurance companies from discriminating through reduced coverage or increased pricing, b) employers from making adverse employment decisions based on a person's genetic code, and c) both insurance companies and employers from requesting or demanding a genetic test. 24 Thus, GINA is interpreted as prohibiting rewards for providing genetic information, including family medical history. In practice, this has led to the elimination of such questions from most HRAs, but imposes no other restrictions on incentive use (Tu and Mayrell 2010) .
State Law and Regulation Relevant to
Wellness Program Incentives are More Complex ERISA exempts self-funded health plans from state insurance regulation and any other state laws insofar as they ''relate to'' an employee benefit plan. Besides this exemption, statelevel insurance laws, anti-discrimination laws, and privacy laws can, in theory, impose restrictions on incentives for wellness programs beyond the restrictions coded in federal law.
State insurance laws (including exceptions for wellness programs). In some states, the use of eligibility criteria other than those based on employment status such as full time/part time (e.g., New York 25 ) or differential premiums for enrollees with similar actuarial risk (i.e., individuals of the same health risk) is prohibited (Simon et al. 2006; Jesson 2008) . Examples of the latter are Kansas 26 and New Hampshire, 27 states that generally do not permit ''any unfair discrimination between individuals of the same class and of essentially the same hazard,'' 26 and Texas, 28 where health factors are only admissible if they are used to establish the general premium schedule in ''accordance with actuarial principles.'' 28, 29 How much of a barrier might these sorts of anti-discrimination insurance regulations plausibly create for insurers that want to institute wellness programs? The answer is that some states require advance regulatory approval of insurance premium structures to ensure that they are consistent with actuarial risk management and considerations of fairness. The Texas statute is illustrative, in that it requires the insurer to file its ''formula or method for computing the schedule of charges for enrollee coverage'' with the state insurance commissioner in advance of use, together with any supporting information that the commissioner requests. 30 Excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory charging schedules are expressly prohibited by the statute. In essence, then, Texas has a premarket licensing scheme in which the state insurance commissioner has the mandate to review differential premium structures for discriminatory impact, based both on actuarial principles and considerations of fairness. Although we cannot say definitively how much scrutiny state insurance regulators actually apply in this regard, there is certainly the potential that discriminatory insurance practices (including some wellness programs) could fall afoul of regulatory review and approval on these grounds.
Perhaps for this reason, several states have adopted explicit exemptions in their insurance laws to protect wellness programs, some of which mirror the HIPAA provisions. In Michigan, for example, insurers can offer program participants premium or costsharing rebates of up to 10%; in Vermont, participation in ''health promotion and disease prevention'' programs can be rewarded with discounts of up to 15% (Mello and Rosenthal 2008) . Some states go a step farther by requiring insurers to offer wellness programs or even to link them to premium discounts. For example, Rhode Island 31 requires small group (i.e., plans offered by employers with up to 50 employees) and individual health plans to offer wellness programs (Jesson 2008) . Florida 32 imposes insurance rebates for employers if a majority of health plan enrollees participate in a wellness program (Mello and Rosenthal 2008) .
Between 2008 and 2010 alone, more than 10 states adopted bills that explicitly exempted wellness incentives from prohibitions on insurance premium rebates or discounts or expanded pre-existing exemptions (e.g., to cover rebates for reaching certain health goals). 33 Thus, while wellness incentives could violate state insurance law in some places, states seem to remove restrictions on wellness incentives.
State laws on employment-related discrimination. State laws against employment-related discrimination potentially could restrict wellness program incentives beyond the ADA. First, they can include employers beyond those covered by the ADA. Some state employment anti-discrimination laws, for example, extend to small businesses (e.g., Michigan has no explicit size threshold), whereas the ADA exempts businesses with fewer than 15 employees.
Second, they can protect individual characteristics beyond those listed by the ADA. For example, New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination defines being handicapped as suffering from ''any mental, psychological or developmental disability,… resulting from anatomical, psychological, physiological or neurological conditions which…is demonstrable, medically or psychologically, by accepted clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques.'' 34 In a case of an employee claiming to have been laid off because of his obesity (Gimello v. Agency Rent-A-Car), the Appellate Division of New Jersey's Superior Court decided that obesity could qualify under this definition as a handicap. 35 Michigan and Washington, D.C., 36 and a few municipalities (e.g., San Francisco, Calif., Santa Cruz, Calif., and Binghamton, N.Y.) have gone so far as to include physical appearance and/or weight and height as protected categories. Such law provisions may challenge the legality of incentives for weight reduction (Jesson 2008; Thomas 2010) .
However, according to Browne et al. (2010) , ''few states offer similar protections, [thus] it is doubtful that many other courts will find the Gimello ruling persuasive.'' There are indeed state-specific limitations in the application of anti-discrimination laws to wellness programs; for example, Washington, D.C.'s law allows the employer the ''reasonable business purpose'' defense. Rothstein and Harrell (2009) suggest it is unlikely that most states' disability laws would go farther than the ADA in challenging the legality of health-risk reduction programs in employersponsored plans.
State privacy laws. The majority of states protect employee privacy by prohibiting employers from discriminating based on employee conduct outside of work. The laws are usually broad enough to prohibit employer discrimination with respect to insurance coverage. Nearly 20 states protect tobacco use only; some states protect use of any lawful product or any lawful activity.
State privacy laws could invalidate financial incentives for wellness program participation if an employee, who pursues a protected activity, refuses to participate or fails to attain the required outcome (Rothstein and Harrell 2009) . However, about 10 states have exceptions in their privacy laws for purposes such as health care coverage incentives. 37 Some even permit wellness incentives explicitly. For example, in Indiana, ''[a]n employer may implement financial incentives: (1) intended to reduce tobacco use; and (2) related to employee health benefits provided by the employer'' (Sonne 2008) . However, in states where privacy laws protect lawful employee conduct outside of work (such as smoking), and where no explicit exception is made for wellness programs, smoking cessation programs that penalize smokers who do not participate could potentially be illegal.
Several state privacy and discrimination laws establish rules regarding the use of genetic information in specific areas. Two types of laws, those governing genetic discrimination by health insurance plans and those governing similar discrimination in employment, could be particularly relevant to wellness programs. In general, these state laws provide protection similar to the GINA. And, although more than 30 states have such laws, to date there have been no reported cases of litigation (Roberts 2010) .
Other state privacy laws, such as state medical privacy rules and physicians' common law obligations of confidentiality, also could potentially interfere if a wellness program requires verification that an employee has attained a health standard to be eligible for an incentive payment (Jesson 2008) .
Discussion
Consistent with past legal scholarly work, we find federal law to impose few restrictions on incentives for bona fide wellness programs. The main federal restriction is the limit under HIPAA's nondiscrimination rule on the amount of the incentive that can be paid to insurance beneficiaries for achieving a healthrelated standard, such as a weight target. However, this limit will increase from the current 20% of cost of coverage to 30% in 2014, and can potentially be increased up to 50%. In addition, HIPAA does not restrict incentives paid by the employer directly, outside of group health insurance.
Recent developments such as the enactment of the ADAAA and the lawsuit brought by the EEOC suggest a broader interpretation of ''disability'' under the ADA, which could, for example, allow obese people to base discrimination claims on the ADA. However, the courts' application of the safe harbor clause seems to provide an exemption for bona fide wellness programs.
While implications of state law for wellness program incentives appear, in theory, to be more ambiguous, 38 we find no evidence for explicit prohibition of wellness incentives, and they seem to remain ''untested in litigation'' (Rubenstein 2009 ). We were unable to identify comprehensive legal scholarly work or clarifying decisions in state appeals courts. Similarly, our search for tribunal court cases in the four most populous states (California, Texas, New York, and Florida), found no relevant jury verdicts, judgments, settlements, or arbitration awards pertaining to disputes over wellness program incentives. These databases are not comprehensive and do not reflect cases without monetary exchange, but they do reveal emerging litigation trends. The lack of settlements and case law may indicate that-contrary to widely spread concerns-legal challenges to bona fide wellness programs that adopt incentives are not bearing a high litigation risk. In addition, over the last few years, several states have introduced or enacted explicit exemptions for wellness programs that mirror the contours of federal legislation reducing the grounds on which incentives can be challenged.
Further, even if legally contested, the financial risk for companies may be relatively limited. 39 They might be held to pay compensatory damages if the plaintiff has incurred a loss, injury, or harm suffered as a result of the wellness incentive scheme that infringes the law. However, in practice in most cases this would mean repaying foregone benefits, and also potentially having the company change the respective provision to ensure its alignment with the law. Punitive damages are, however, rather unlikely as long as the benefits plan was established in good faith. The fact that, overall, many legislative efforts are aimed at promoting participation in wellness programs or achieving positive health outcomes and have paved the way for the use of incentives supports the assumption that establishing such an incentive is most probably driven by good intentions and not the desire to exploit health plan members and employees.
However, should wellness program incentives be legally challenged in the future we expect obesity-which is one of the key drivers for rapidly increasingly prevalence of chronic diseases, and therefore health care cost (Mokdad et al. 2001; Wang et al. 2011; Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, and Wang 2003; Yang and Hall 2008) -to be the primary battleground. As obesity is strongly influenced by individual choices about nutrition and exercise (Goodpaster et al. 2010; Cutler, Glaeser, and Shapiro 2003) , policymakers and employers are very interested in effective weight loss interventions. At the same time, obesity is known to have genetic and social determinants (Fishbein 2001; Biondi 2010) , implying that obese individuals should not face draconian financial penalties. This ambiguity and the magnitude of the societal challenge obesity poses make it the most prominent case for discussions on wellness program incentives. Theoretically, the abundance of legal rules and theories affecting insurance, together with divided authority at state and federal levels, create room for lawsuits over what kinds of incentives for weight loss might or might not be allowed, and lots of different technical grounds for courts to overrule wellness programs and incentives targeting obesity.
Conclusions
Several aspects of federal and state law can hypothetically create impediments to implementing wellness incentives. However, litigation patterns suggesting the challenge of wellness incentives on those grounds so far have not arisen; on the contrary, the legislative trend seems to be moving toward the creation of exceptions for wellness incentives from potentially challenging legislation. Also, the judicial practice of awarding punitive damages only in cases of flagrantly exploitative behavior makes an application to bona fide wellness incentive schemes most improbable. We argue that in light of this, the perceived risk of financial repercussions resulting from a legal challenge of a wellness program that has been established bona fide and is linked to a related incentive scheme is in practice overestimated by the relevant stakeholders.
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1 As pointed out recently by Baicker, Cutler, and Song (2010) there is no single broadly accepted definition of ''wellness program [s] .'' For purposes of this paper, however, we use that term to refer to a program designed to promote health or prevent disease among beneficiaries. 2 We asked interviewees to rate-on a scale of 1 (no impact) to 5 (high impact)-how much they thought different environmental factors influence their ability to provide chronic care management. The following statistics show the share of health plans that rated the factors' influence as 4 (moderate) and 5 (high 252 (2006) . 29 So for example, Texas law prohibits insurers from deviating from the terms of an approved insurance underwriting and premium structure that has been designed based on actuarial principles once heightened health risks associated with a particular beneficiary actually manifest. Insurers are not allowed to unpool (or ''deactuarialize'') risk after the fact-that is, the insurer wouldn't be able to wait until a particular person actually developed AIDS, and then go back to modify that individual's benefits or copays or deductibles in a way that shifts risk back onto that person without regard to the relevant actuarial risk pool and plan structure. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. 1 1271. 252 (2006 38 The ambiguity is also compounded by uncertainty about whether ERISA pre-emption might serve to invalidate any of the various state law provisions, in any particular set of circumstances. 39 Also of note is that it will depend on the specific state laws on which the legal challenge is based whether, for example, the individual has the right to bring a private suit or if the enforcement of the law is limited to public agencies.
